Xavier Vilà (2008)
A Model-To-Model Analysis of Bertrand Competition
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
vol. 11, no. 2 11
<https://www.jasss.org/11/2/11.html>
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Received: 04-Aug-2007 Accepted: 16-Mar-2008 Published: 31-Mar-2008
where A^{s} denotes the row of A corresponding to the strategy s.
Figure 1. Vector Field with non-loyal consumers |
Figure 2. Vector Field with loyal consumers |
Figure 3. Vector Field with loyal consumers (and Tat for Tit) |
Figure 4. Vector Field with non-loyal consumers |
Figure 5. Vector Field with loyal consumers |
Figure 6. Vector Field with loyal consumers (and Tat for Tit) |
Figure 7. The Tit for Tat automaton |
Automata 1: 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 | Automata 2: 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 |
Automata 1: 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 | Automata 2: 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 |
Tit for Tat: 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 | Always low price: 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 |
Tit for Tat: 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 | Always low price: 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 |
Figure 8. Evolution of Average Payoffs |
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